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What role does the Indian Constitution play towards the emancipation of the
society’s most marginalized and excluded? What vision does the Constitution
espouse with respect to basic fundamental rights and freedoms? And what
conception of inclusion and pluralism does the Constitution pursue in a society that
remains deeply divided and disjointed? All these searching questions came to form
a distinct part of the decision of the Indian Supreme Court (Court) when it was called
upon to rule on the constitutional validly of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. It was not the first time however, that the Court was examining Section 377 on
the touchstone of the Constitution, as the case previously travelled through several
levels of judicial adjudication involving different jurisdictional procedures (covered
on this blog here, and also useful to refer here). In this post, I do not detail the entire
set of constitutional argumentation that was advanced in what came out to be almost
500 pages of judicial reasoning. Instead, I highlight how the Indian Constitution was
singularly understood and interpreted in the light of its transformative potential and
through its mandate of ushering change within the Indian society.
Embodying the ethos of Victorian morality, Section 377, a colonial-era law,
criminalized ‘…carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman
or animal…’. Anything that was not penal-vaginal sexual encounter was ‘against
the order of nature’ and as a consequence ‘unnatural’. Through this provision,
homosexual acts even between consenting adults was considered and proscribed
as a criminal offense punishable with imprisonment. Thus, a significant section of the
population comprising the LGBT+ community remained perpetually ostracized by the
Indian society, persecuted by State authorities and marginalized in the discourse of
constitutional rights. Therefore, when the Court decided in Navtej Johar v Union of
India that Section 377 in so far as it criminalizes same sex acts between consenting
adults, violates the constitutional mandate enshrined under the Fundamental Rights
chapter, especially, Art. 21 (life and personal liberty), Art. 14 (equality and equal
protection of laws), Art. 15 (non-discrimination) and Art. 19 (Freedom of expression),
truly, it was a historic undoing of injustice towards the LGBT+ people. In other words,
as a result of this decision, LGBT+ people who were historically and by default
considered ‘criminals’ under the law, came a bit closer to acquiring an ‘equal moral
membership’ of the society and the State.
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Transformative Constitutionalism and the Indian
Constitution
In declaring Section 377 to be unconstitutional, however, the Court was deeply
reflective about the fact that for Constitutional rights to acquire a meaningful
purpose for the marginalised communities,  disciplining State action alone will not
be sufficient. In this regard, the Court did not mince words when it stated that it is
both, criminality of the law and the ‘silence and stigmatization’ of the society towards
the LGBT+ community that orchestrates the marginalization and the exclusion of the
former. Implicit in that claim was the understanding that inequality, hierarchy and
prejudice transpires as much from State action as it does from societal sanctions,
community conventions and private relationships. In the context of such social
realities, what is the stated role of the Constitution and the laws? Is the mandate of
the Constitution simply confined towards ordering the relationship between the State
and the individual (vertical) or does the Constitution have an equal role to play in
shaping normative values among individuals within the society?
The Court unequivocally embraced the latter narrative and found that the Indian
Constitution envisions an expansive role for both the State and the individual
to actively promote social change within the contours of the Constitution. It
seeks transformative change ‘in the order of relations not just between the State
and the individual, but also between individuals’. The transformative potential
in Indian Constitution is a conscious ‘attempt to reverse the socializing of
prejudice, discrimination, and power hegemony in a disjointed society’. Therefore,
the Constitution, the Court surmises, obliges not only the State not to violate
fundamental rights, but also individuals to ‘act in a manner that advances and
promotes the Constitutional order of values’.
The understanding of a constitution as a transformative document is certainly not
new and has an established lineage in several post-colonial constitutions. The
idea of transformative constitutionalism lies in its emancipatory pursuit and in the
conviction that large-scale social change within a certain political system is possible
through the process and instrumentality of the law. Transformative constitutionalism
enjoins a certain reading of the constitutional text that eschews formalism, pure
positivism and legalism and advances an interpretation that acknowledges and
responds to the reality of hierarchical structures and power relationships within a
society. Most importantly, however, a transformative constitution breaks with the
legal tradition of situating private relationships and community conventions outside of
the constitutional mould, subjecting societal mores to constitutional values.
True to that vision, the Court held that a substantive understanding of Art. 14 reflects
‘the quest for ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of human
endeavor and in every facet of human existence’. Substantive equality entitles LGBT
+ people to equal protection of the laws and to participate in both public and private
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affairs as equal citizens of the country. Similarly, by acknowledging that Section
377 violates Art. 15 (sex discrimination) as it ‘perpetuates stereotypes’ against the
LGBT community that is rooted in traditional gender roles, the Court essentially
uncovered the relationship between ‘heterosexual expectations of society’ and
State criminalization of homosexuality. It is this unwholesome nexus between State
law and ‘public morality’ that transformative constitutionalism purports to break
and imagine instead, ‘a transformation in the order of relations’ among individuals,
society and the State.
Such a demanding standard notwithstanding, the Indian Supreme Court was equally
pragmatic and underscored that transformation and change within the Indian society,
especially through the instrumentality of the law is going to be an incremental
process. Through which framework and within what paradigm does one need to
advance such transformation? The Court answers that it is only through the ideals
of ‘Constitutional morality’ that the transformative vision of the Constitution fully
comes alive. Constitutional morality in this sense is the ‘guiding spirit’ to achieve
transformation within the society. Referring to one of the founding members of the
Indian Constitution, Dr. B.R Ambedkar, the Court identified constitutional morality in
its most pristine form as encapsulating the notion of ‘diversity’ and ‘inclusiveness’.
Therefore, law and in this case Section 377 which perpetuates discrimination and
breeds inequality towards a certain social class, even if endorsed by ‘public/social
morality’, fails the test of constitutional validity.
The Court’s reading of the Indian Constitution in the present case is far-reaching,
especially as regards the question of when and under what circumstances the State
is allowed to restrict fundamental rights. The Court’s insistence on an expansive
reading of substantive equality would entail a higher scrutiny of future State
legislation that tramples individual rights. The use of ‘legitimate State purpose’ to
circumscribe a certain right can no longer be merely a reflection of ‘public/social’
morality and has to meet the test of ‘constitutional’ morality. Moreover, the real
import of transformative constitutionalism lies in positive measures that the State
ought to take in bringing the Constitution closer to the most deprived. It will be
interesting to see how that translates into a fuller interaction of the chapter on
Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights under the Constitution.
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